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Abstract This paper presents the RISK-UEmethodology for the seismic risk assess-
ment of utility systems (potable water, waste-water, gas system, telecommunication,
electric power) and transportation infrastructures (port, airport, road and railway
system). The proposed methodology provides a uniform basis for the reduction of the
consequences of lifeline damages in urban areas and an efficient mitigation strategy
and prioritization policies for pre-earthquake and post earthquake actions. A detailed
inventory for every element at risk together with a reliable seismic hazard assessment,
appropriate selection of fragility models, estimation of the “global value” and eco-
nomical impact of lifeline damages and losses are the main steps of the proposed
methodology. The consideration of European distinctive features of lifelines and util-
ity systems in the construction of seismic scenarios and the proposition of fragility
curves are among the basic aims of the proposed methodology. Different modules
of the methodology were applied in seven pilot cities (Thessaloniki, Catania, Nice,
Bucharest, Sofia, Barcelona, Bitola). We present herein few representative examples
(case studies) in order to illustrate the methodology and to prove its efficiency.
Keywords RISK-UE · Lifelines · Utility systems · Seismic hazard · Risk ·
Mitigation · Inventory · Vulnerability
1 Introduction
Lifelines are vital for the community as they supply energy and fresh water, treat the
waste water and provide transportation and communication services to inhabitants.
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Their role is even more important in modern developed societies where living con-
ditions, the economic, cultural and social activities are fully depended on a complex
network of lifelines. In addition, the seismic protection of urban areas with high pop-
ulation density, substantial residential building growth and important administrative,
commercial and industrial activities dictates a reliable assessment of the associated
seismic vulnerability and the establishment of a reliable risk mitigation strategy for
lifelines.
In Europe few efforts have been made so far to develop a reliable methodology to
evaluate the vulnerability indexes for lifelines systems (i.e., water) and to assess the
vulnerability of specific lifeline componentswithin urban areas exposed to seismic risk.
The lack of numerous European researches on this issue is inversely promotional to
the high seismicity of certain areas especially in the south part of Europe, the extreme
complexity, the spatial extent and interdependencies between the networks and the
urban environment, their spatial variability and differences in typology from one
country to another, the difficulty to establish a reliable and complete inventory and
the difficulties in sharing necessary information and data, even if the specific network
plays an important role in the security and health of citizens, has been also contributed
to this lack of specific research studies. Considering all these difficulties and the inher-
ent uncertainties in the assessment of seismic hazard, the definition and description
of urban characteristics, the construction of fragility curves for all components and
sub-components of all lifeline systems, RISK-UE project “An advance approach to
earthquake risk scenarios with applications to different European towns” financed
by the European Commission is a major step toward the development of a European
methodology to assess and mitigate the seismic risk of lifelines and essential facili-
ties in Europe. RISK-UE project was entrusted to synthesize the available European
knowledge and know-how in lifeline earthquake engineering, to collect damage data
and information of lifelines inventory (water, waste-water, gas, telecommunication,
electric power, roads, railways systems, port, airport) of seven characteristic Euro-
pean cities, to classify the available information, to provide if possible an European
typology and to develop a lifeline seismic risk assessment methodology according to
European specific features of lifelines, urban fabric characteristics and seismic hazard
assessment. RISK-UE reflects the European know-how, expertizes different ways of
facing issues regarding loss estimation and risk mitigation and should be considered
as a first step in the development of a coherent and unified European approach.
Emphasis was given to the synergies between urban environment and lifelines in
normal, crisis and recovery period. The combination of lifelines importance through a
“global value” approach, the vulnerability assessment of lifelines and the seismicity for
three operation periods provide in RISK-UE the necessary mitigation strategy. Ref-
erences and discussion are made with other world-wide methodologies (e.g., ATC13,
HAZUS).
In the present stage of RISK-UE development, there isn’t any software develop-
ment similar to Hazus, although GIS platform was used in each step of the method-
ology. While network analysis (connectivity, serviceability) was not initially foreseen
in some specific networks and pilot cities such analyses were made (i.e., connectivity
analysis for Thessaloniki gas system, rough serviceability analysis for Thessaloniki
water network, serviceability of the roadway network in Catania). The paper presents
the main steps of the RISK-UE methodology through the presentation of typical
examples. More details and thorough discussion on many methodological aspects
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may be found in the RISK-UE final technical report for lifelines (Monge et al. 2004),
as well as in Pitilakis et al. (2005a).
2 Methodology
In the last years, several methodologies were introduced for lifeline risk assessment
in urban environment aiming to minimize losses, enhance the reliability of the sys-
tems and improve mitigation policies. Moreover, a variety of hazards were consid-
ered (earthquakes, floods, wind, ice-storms, tornados, etc) along with different hazard
scenarios, different recurrence period and in some cases different aspects of uncer-
tainty. Scawthorn et al. (1999), Reed and Cook (1999) and Seligson (2003) have
introduced methodologies for water and waste-water system, while Ballantyne et al.
(1999), Huyck et al. (2003) and Chang and Seligson (2003) for power supply systems.
Modular methodologies for specific networks were developed as well. For example,
Werner et al. (2000) developed a methodology for the seismic risk assessment of
highway networks, including models for transportation network analysis, hazard esti-
mation, seismic performance of highway components and evaluation of the economic
impact. A similarmethodology for highway systemwas proposed byKiremidjian et al.
(2003). Pachakis and Kiremidjian (2004) proposed a model to assess probabilistically
the operational losses of container ports for different seismic scenarios.
Multi-hazard methodology tools were recently introduced to evaluate the vulner-
ability and the performance of lifelines under a variety of natural and technological
hazards. HAZUS (NIBS 1999, 2004) is a typical example of an advanced GIS multi-
hazard methodology.
RISK-UE is intended to be a unified earthquake risk assessmentmethodology con-
sidering the distinctive features of European towns with their real building stock of
modern and historical buildings, together with lifelines and essential facilities. Weak
points of urban systems are evaluated through detailed seismic hazard assessment
including local soil conditions, and complete the inventory databases of all elements
at risk. For selected seismic scenarios direct and indirect damages are calculated
mainly for the building stock.
The overall approach of RISK-UE methodology for lifelines is presented in Fig. 1.
It highlights the various modules and their interconnections (Pitilakis et al. 2005a).
The following presentation is articulated on the basis of this flowchart.
3 Description—inventory
The general description of each particular lifeline network provides an illustration of
the overall system and the direct or indirect relations and connection links between
components and subcomponents. As an example, a first level breakdown of a rail-
way transportation system is given in Table 1. Based on the description scheme the
next crucial step is the elaboration and development in GIS format of the detailed
inventory of all components.
The inventory of each network includes the description of the distinctive features of
the different components (e.g., geometry, material, age, etc) and the definition of their
typology. Within RISK-UE project, descriptive templates and catalogues with avail-
able information for every element at risk of lifelines were produced. The proposed
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Fig. 1 Flowchart of RISK-UE methodology
Table 1 Breakdown of a typical railway transportation system
Rolling Stock Railway Facilities Railroad Infrastructure
Buildings Specific infrastructures
– Terminal stations; –Bridges;
– Maintenance; – Tunnels;
– Control house; – Retaining walls;
– Administrative – Overpasses;
– Drainage systems
Utilities Track’s installations
– Electric power; – Level crossings;
– Fuel facilities; – Signaling;
– Water/Waste water – Electro-motion;
– Gas – Telecommunication
Tracks
inventories (Monge et al. 2004) are a synthesis and enhancement of similar inven-
tory databases, initially developed for the seismic risk assessment of lifelines in USA
(ALA 2002; NIBS 1999, 2004; ATC-13 1985 etc) and adequately adapted to consider
the European distinctive features. A representative example of such questionnaire is
given below for the water-pipelines (Table 2).
Based in the above inventory catalogues, all relevant data should be collected for
the lifeline networks in each city, and incorporated in a GIS platform. The accurate
description of the distinctive features in the light of the seismic risk evaluation is
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Table 2 Inventory for water system (RISK-UE methodology)
Detailed inventory for water pipelines
General information:
Geographic location (coordinates), Location of pressure reduction valves (coordinates), Exact loca-
tion of connections (coordinates), Location of manhole (central, smaller), Location of isolation
valves, of SCADA, In case of failure: Isolation of pipe segments (area coverage, number of
customers).
Geometrical and construction details:
Length (m), Type (fragile, ductile), Diameter (mm), Thickness (mm), Elevated or buried, Material,
Strain: σy, σ f (Mpa), Connection type (compression coupling, bell & spigot, heat fusion, arc or
oxyacetylene gas weld), Rotation tolerance, Depth (m), Type of coating, Type of lining, Type
of protection material (if any), Operational characteristics (free-flow, with pressure), Operation
pressure (atm), Directivity of flow, Year of construction, Corrosion (yes, no, possible, unknown),
Description of construction technique, History of failures/ repairs (not only from earthquakes
but also from operation use), Method of repair.
Urban & economic characteristics:
Type of customers served (important, common), Connection with essential/critical facilities (e.g.,
hospitals, clinics etc), Alternative routing, Time of emptying pipe segment, Economic cost of
construction, Cost of reconstruction if damaged by an earthquake.
Basic features of water pipelines
Geographic location, Diameter, Thickness, Material, Connection type, Operational characteristics,
Distances between connections, Type of customers served,Connectionwith essential/critical facil-
ities, Description of construction technique, Alternative routing, Location of manhole, Location
of valves, isolation valves etc, Location of SCADA, Economic cost of construction.
an important step for the definition of the typology. A typical example is shown in
Fig. 2 for the water system of Thessaloniki. However, several difficulties arise in the
collection and archiving of the data, related to the aging of networks (unknown loca-
tion, material etc), digitization process, competition between the lifeline managing
companies, security issues or even unwillingness of lifeline owners to provide data.
4 Typology
Until RISK-UE there was no European typology for lifelines. RISK-UE methodol-
ogy provided the basis for the definition of typology for each lifeline element at risk
that is essential for the vulnerability analysis. Through the collection of the inven-
tory information in the seven cities representing different countries and construction
practices, mean typology characteristics of lifelines were derived. The final selection
took also into consideration the typology found in bibliography. A typical example for
water systems is given in Table 3. Detailed typology description for all components
and lifelines may be found in Monge et al. (2004).
5 Seismic hazard
Damages to lifeline elements and systems are caused by ground shaking, large per-
manent ground deformation and ground failure or combination of them. Most of the
damages to pipelines are normally reported when a pipeline is crossing soils with
substantial impedance contrast. Consequently spatial variability of ground motion




Fig. 2 Thessaloniki: Map of the water system in Thessaloniki and statistical data (a) construction
year, (b) length of pipes according to diameter classes and (c) pipe material
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Table 3 Typology of element at risk for water system
Element at risk HAZUS (NIBS 1999, 2004) ALA (2001a, b) RISK-UE
Pipes Material (Ductile, Fragile) Material (Steel, PVC, PE,





Tanks Material (steel, R/C, wood,
open-cut) Type of founda-
tion (elevated, at-graded,
buried) Type of anchorage
(yes, no)
Material (steel, R/C, wood,
open-cut) Type of anchor-
age (yes, no) Type of
foundation (elevated, at-
graded, buried) Capac-
ity (small, medium, large)












Pumping station Size (small, medium, large)
Type of anchorage (yes, no)
– Similar to
HAZUS
and local soil conditions can alter greatly the performance of lifeline systems as a
result of their large extend. The spatial distribution of seismic loading, due to wave
propagation is described in terms of peak ground acceleration (PGA), spectral values
of acceleration, peak ground velocity (PGV) or strains, while for permanent ground
deformation and ground failure in terms of permanent ground displacement (PGD)
or dislocation (i.e., fault rupture or extensive landslide). Intensity descriptors i.e., in
MSK scale, usually applied in case of building’s vulnerability are not adequate to
describe lifeline damages.
InRISK-UE, for each element at risk, the appropriate parameter of seismicmotion
was defined according to the particular characteristics of the lifeline components and
the state-of-the-art knowledge and practice regarding the seismic design of lifelines.
For bridges the best descriptor is a response spectral value at a specific period (i.e.,
T = 1.0 s) or the PGA values both accounting for local soil conditions. For other
lifeline elements at risk it may be PGA (i.e., buildings, tanks, waterfront structures) or
permanent ground deformations (i.e., embankments, roadways, railways). For pipe-
lines, PGV has been proved to be better correlated to the observed damages and thus
the vulnerability assessments must be based on peak or “effective” ground velocity
estimates. Moreover, in an advanced approach for pipelines it should be necessary to
consider the spatial distribution of ground longitudinal or/and transversal strains that
can be derived only from systematic analyses of local site conditions and adequate
seismic ground response analyses.
In case of urban sites, a systematic analysis of seismic ground response analysis
is commonly referred as microzonation study (Mouroux et al. 2004, Pitilakis 2004).
Specific geotechnical and surface geology information is required to estimate the
necessary ground shaking or deformation parameters.
RISK-UE risk assessment methodology for lifelines, is a multi-level approach that
can be applied according to the principal of an “acceptable level of damage”. Defining
the “acceptable damage”, several definitions should be accounted according to eco-
nomic prosperity of the country, the pre-defined safety level for each lifeline system,
the international practice, and, the natonal laws and the codes. Considering the need
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of European harmonization regarding natural hazards mitigation and safety level a
common acceptable risk should enact all over the European continent. However as,
every element at risk is prone to specific seismic scenarios, probably with different
return period according to its importance, the selection of the most appropriate or
“worst” seismic scenario isn’t a simple decision. In RISK-UE a uniform approach
has been developed for the estimation of the earthquake ground shaking hazard and
induced effects in urban areas. For details see the accompanying paper of Faccioli
(2005) in this journal. Emphasis was placed on adopting homogenous criteria in the
quantitative treatment of seismicity and in the construction of ground shaking sce-
narios, which are also depending on the level of detail of hazard in each city. It is also
suggested that ground motion scenarios should be both of deterministic and constant
hazard type, adapted for intensity based damage assessment using damage probability
matrices (i.e., for buildings) and also for more sophisticated assessments as described
above for lifelines or based on capacity curves for different classes of building.
A representative example of a high level hazard assessment with systematic 1D
site specific ground response analysis for a probabilistic scenario with 475 years recur-
rence period is given for Thessaloniki in Figs. 3 through 7, illustrating detailed maps
for peak horizontal ground acceleration (PHGA, Figs. 3, 4) for different spectral peri-
ods (T = 0.0 s and 1.0 s), peak horizontal ground velocities (PHGV, Fig. 5), mean
effective ground shear strains at −3.0m (Fig. 6), liquefaction associated settlements
and horizontal lateral spreading displacements (Fig. 7). Similar maps for PHGA at
T = 0.0 s are given for Catania (Fig. 8, Faccioli et al. 2004) and Barcelona (Fig. 9,
Roca 2004). Special attention is given to the uncertainties associated with the seismic
load and it was suggested that all seismic parameters must be estimated with a mean
value± a standard deviation.
Fig. 3 Thessaloniki: Spatial
distribution of mean peak
horizontal ground acceleration
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Fig. 4 Thessaloniki: Spatial
distribution of mean peak








Fig. 5 Thessaloniki: Spatial
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Fig. 6 Thessaloniki: Spatial
distribution of mean strain
values (%) in z = −3m
0 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.2
Fig. 7 Thessaloniki: Estimated settlements and lateral spreading due potential liquefaction for a
475-year recurrence period in the coastal zone of the central city
6 Global value
The classification of the relative importance of different parts of a lifeline system
inside the urban fabric is necessary to evaluate the direct and indirect losses for a
specific seismic scenario and to propose adequate mitigation strategies.
International practice usually identifies the strategic/important issues for three
main periods of urban functioning: normal, crisis (during and fewhours after the earth-
quake) and recovery (that extents after the disaster). RISK-UE adopted the above
practice and extents it to include the functional and social vulnerability,
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Fig. 8 Catania: Spatial
distribution of response
spectral acceleration for period
T = 0(amax.), including effects
of soil conditions, for level I
scenario earthquake (Faccioli
2005)
Fig. 9 Barcelona: Spatial distribution of spectral acceleration values at T = 0.0 s based on determin-
istic (left) and probabilistic (right) approach for a return period of 475 years
the functional relations between different elements, the urban activities (produc-
tion, consumption, exchanges) and the relations of the lifeline networks with their
surrounding urban or rural environment. This way, each lifeline network is analyzed
as an integrated part of the seismic risk scenario and as a part of the urban system,
composed of human, material and immaterial elements at risk. In addition, the main
issues of the lifeline system are identified according to various factors that describe
the role of each element in the urban global system. Crude estimations for three
periods of functioning (normal, crisis and restoration) based on generic approach of
grouping lifeline elements according to similar characteristics were used to define the
“weak points” of lifeline systems according to specific seismic scenarios and particu-
lar characteristics of the urban environment. To achieve this, it is proposed to define
appropriate qualitative or quantitative indicators for each one of the three periods
and to evaluate the global value per element at risk using value scaling factors rele-
vant to measuring units, (Masure and Lutoff 2003). A simple expert mechanism for
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supporting decision-making processing for risk management of water system was also
proposed in Alexoudi et al. (2005). Alexoudi (2005) presents also specific indicators
and supporting decision-making processing for waste-water, gas and telecommunica-
tion systems.
The basic steps for the evaluation of “urban system exposure” and global value
for lifelines involve the analysis of every system in its components, the selection of
appropriate descriptive indicators together with their relative weight for the three
operation periods, the estimation of the global value of each part of the lifeline net-
work and finally, which is the ultimate scope of this analysis, the classification of every
part and sub-component of each lifeline network in three categories: main, important
and secondary. Failure of a secondary element is less important and does not affect
the operation level and serviceability of the whole system, while failure of a main
component may affect the whole system.
The selection of adequate indicators is an important part of the proposed method-
ology. For example in the case of water conduits the selected indicators are: function
(supply dependingon thediameter) emergency (SCADAorother system), connection
with fire fighting system, connection with essential facilities (i.e., hospitals, temporary
settlement camps) and relative radiance (i.e., urban use). An application illustrat-
ing the final output of the proposed methodology is given in Figs. 10 and 11 for the
Thessaloniki water and gas systems respectively.
7 Interactions
Interaction means a mutual or reciprocal action or influence. High dependence be-
tween lifelines and essential facilities may be very important and can develop a chain
of consequences due to individual damages. In RISK-UE four types of interactions
between lifelines systemshavebeenused adopted fromKameda (2000) (Physical dam-
age propagation, functional damage propagation, recovery interruption and back-up
functions of substitute systems). Interactions may seriously affect the previous global
value estimates. Table 4 provides a short reminder of the influence according to the
systems involved, the direction of the influence (to have influence on/to be influ-
enced by), the effective time of influence (before/during/after an earthquake) and its
importance (slight/strong). Interactions are referring to the previously defined oper-
ation periods, while small and capital letters distinct slight or stronger interactions
respectively.
8 Vulnerability curves
A fundamental requirement for assessing the seismic performance of a system is the
ability to quantify the potential damage as a function of the level of seismic hazard
intensity. The vulnerability assessment is usually performed introducing appropriate
fragility curves developed for every lifeline component. Fragility functions for each
element at risk are defined based on empirical, analytical, expert judgment proce-
dures. In Europe although in the past 30 years several strong earthquakes occurred
especially across the Mediterranean region, only for Bucharest (1977), Montenegro
(1980), Kocaeli-Duzce (1999) and Lefkas (2003) earthquakes brief reports for the
lifeline damage are available.
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Fig. 10 Thessaloniki:
Definition of main, important
and secondary issues for water
system based on global value
analysis in different operation
periods (a) normal (b) crisis
and (c) recovery
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Fig. 11 Thessaloniki: Definition of main, important and secondary issues for gas system based on
global value analysis in different operation periods (a) normal (b) crisis and (c) recovery
In the framework of this project, several fragility curves of international bibliog-
raphy were compared to each other and validated with available damage data. As
an example, several researchers proposed empirical fragility curves either for wave
propagation (O’Rourke and Ayala 1993, Eidinger 1998, Eidinger and Avila 1999,
Isoyama et al. 1998, ALA 2001a,b) or for PGD (Honegger and Eguchi 1992, Eidinger
and Avila 1999, ALA 2001a,b) for water and gas pipelines. Such relations corre-
late ground motions parameters with the Repair Rate/km for pipeline (Table 5, Fig.
12). Important differences are observed, due to the assumptions made by different
researchers, the type of correlation analyses, the method of estimating the PGV and
PGD in each case, the accuracy of damage data, the seismotectonic background, the
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Table 4 Reminder of possible interaction between the different systems
influence of site effects, the typology of the pipelines and construction practices and
the reliability of pipeline inventory.
The above fragility relations were validated using reported damage data from
Duzce (Ms = 7.3, 12/11/1999, Turkey) and Lefkas earthquake (Ms = 6.4, 14/08/2003,
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Table 5 Fragility relationships for pipelines
Ground shaking Ground failure
O’Rourke and Ayala (1993): K*(10−4*PGV2.25),
K: type (fragile, ductile)






Eidinger and Avila (1999):
K2*23.674*(PGD)0.53
Eidinger and Avila (1999): K1*1.512*(PGV
1.98),
K1: material, connection type, soil, diameter
K2: material, connection type
Isoyama et al. (1998): Cp*Cd*3.11*10-3*(PGV-
5)1.3, Cp & Cd: material, diameter
ALA (2001a, b): K1* 0.241*PGV, ALA (2001a, b): K2*11.223*PGD
0.319,
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Fig. 12 Comparison between different empirical vulnerability relations for ductile pipes for ground
shaking (PGV left) and permanent ground deformations (PGD right)
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Fig. 13 Comparison between empirical and analytical fragility curves for single span R/C bridges
Greece), (Alexoudi 2005; Pitilakis et al. 2005b). Based on these validations it was
found that theALA(2001a,b) relationships forwater/waste-water systemand Isoyama
et al. (1998) for gas system are most suitable for the European distinctive features.
Another typical comparative example is given in Fig. 13 presenting fragility curves
for single span R/C bridges. The comparison was made between empirical (Shinozuka
et al. 2003) and analytical (Mander and Basoz 1999) fragility curves. It is observed
that the analytical curves, which have been also introduced in HAZUS methodology,
overestimate the damage state probability for this type of bridges. In Europe there
are few analytical-numerical studies proposing fragility curves for some typical Euro-
pean types of bridges (Flesch et al. 1998; GNDT 2000). Further studies are needed to
complete all possible typologies.
Consequently, RISK-UE proposed to use fragility curves, mainly derived from
existing curves from international bibliography (e.g., NIBS 1999, 2004; ALA 2001a,b)
when no appropriate curves are available in Europe.
9 Vulnerability assessment
An important issue for the vulnerability assessment of lifeline is the definition of
damage state. The most common way to define earthquake consequences of individ-
ual lifeline components is a classification in terms of damage states: No damage—
Slight/minor—Moderate—Extensive—Complete. This approach requires an agree-
ment about the definition and the content of each damage state and this is not always
a straight forward procedure. In general the definition of damage states is rather
subjective. Thus, alternative expressions, usually called functional states, are also sug-
gested, possibly reflecting better the damages consequence for a specific seismic sce-
nario than previous damage states:
Typically the alternative expressions are defined as:
– Functionality
– Serviceability
– Nominal use, reduced use or not usable;
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Table 6 Different damage state definitions for water source subject to earthquake
Serviceability Functionality Conventional damage state description
(Hazus 2004)
No water available Not repairable Complete Building collapsing.
Operational Extensive The building being exten-
sively damaged or the well
pump and vertical shaft
being badly distorted and
non-functional.
after repairs
Reduced flow or pressure Operational without
repair
Moderate Malfunction of well pump
and motor for about a
week due to loss of electric
power and backup power
if any, considerable damage
to mechanical and electri-
cal equipment, or moder-
ate damage to buildings.
Slight/Minor Malfunction of well pump
and motor for a short time
(less than 3 days) due to
loss of electric power and
backup power if any, or
light damage to buildings.
Nominal flow or pressure None None
– Usable without repairs, after repairs or not repairable.
– Damage factor or replacement cost (usually between 0% and 1% or 100%).
Evaluation of these functional states is useful to understand the impact of lifeline
response in the emergency and post earthquake responses. An example of damage
state definition according to different approaches for water source is given in Table 6.
Based on the selected fragility curves, vulnerability assessment studies have been
performed in the case studies cities for the seismic scenario with 475 years reccu-
rence period. All vulnerability studies have been implemented in GIS environment,
while different thematicmapswere produced showing the distribution of the expected
damages of individual components.
Figures 14 and 15 illustrate an example of damage estimation for the bridges and
the water system in Thessaloniki based on the results of natural hazard assessment.
The spatial distribution of the spectral acceleration values at T = 1.0 s and the peak
ground velocities together with the estimated PGD values were utilized for the vul-
nerability assessment of the bridges and water pipelines respectively. It is shown that
the majority of bridges will perform rather in a satisfactory way, but there are still few
bridges in the western part of the city, which are expected to sustain serious damage
for the specific seismic hazard scenario. This is due to the higher vulnerability of these
bridges (single column, simple support bridges and inadequate seismic design) and
the higher values of the expected surface spectral acceleration because in this area
the soil conditions are deep soft alluvium deposits, sandy-silty clays to clayey sands-
silts, with low strength and high compressibility, (category C and D in EC8), thus the
ground shaking presents stronger amplification at longer periods.
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Fig. 14 Thessaloniki: Distribution of damages to R/C bridges (scenario of 475 years recurrence
period)
In Fig. 16 is presented another application example for the vulnerability assess-
ment of the gas and water system in Catania based on the PGV values estimated for a
deterministic earthquake scenario (Faccioli et al. 2004). The distribution of repair rate
for water system shows that the network is expected to suffer 13 ruptures on a total
length of 220 km, while the network of gas mains is estimated to suffer two ruptures
on a total length of 37 km.
10 Network/reliability analysis
There are co-seismic and post seismic criteria describing the performance of any
lifeline systems. Co-seismic criteria quantify the component’s structural performance
according to certain predefined standards in terms of density of damage (%), con-
nectivity or serviceability analysis. In RISK-UE, a density of lifelines damage is given
for each of lifeline component according to available information while in some cities
more advanced approaches were made.
An important issue in case of risk analysis of roadway networks in urban areas
with high built-up density is the reduction of traffic flow or the blockage of roads
due to debris of collapsed buildings and consequently the prevention of rescue and
restoration activities. Within RISK-UE a preliminary approach is proposed in order
to define the level of road’s obstruction due to the adjacent building collapses. Build-
ing damages and collapses were estimated using specific vulnerability functions and
relative inventories. Detailed presentation of the RISK-UE approach for the vulner-
ability assessment of buildings may be found in the final RISK-UE reports and in







Fig. 15 Thessaloniki: Distribution of damages to water system (scenario of 475 years recurrence
period)
related papers in this journal (Lagomarsino and Giovinazzi 2005, Kappos et al. 2005).
Simple, yet realistic, collapse shapes are assumed in order to define a relationship
between the building’s height (i.e., number of storeys) and the width of the induced
debris. Based on the damage assessment of buildings and the traffic data, it is possible
to estimate the serviceability of the roadway network for a certain seismic scenario
and to develop efficient emergency response and recovery planning. In Fig. 17 an
example for the city of Catania is presented (Faccioli et al. 2004), where escape routes
are identified during the crisis period, based on minimum network travel distance and
considering both the extent and the location of damage.
11 Losses
The losses from a destructive earthquake are distinguished as direct and indirect. The
estimation of direct losses is usually based on the repair or replacement cost of the
damaged element while indirect losses is closely connected with reduction of pro-
duction and other economic and social impacts. RISK-UE in its present stage is not
intending to propose models for economical and other indirect. This important part
will be one of the major future developments.
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Fig. 16 Catania: Seismic damage scenario for gas and water mains
Fig. 17 Catania: Minimum distance between the “XX Settembre” primary school and the Garibaldi
hospital before (left) and after the earthquake (right)
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12 Restoration policy—mitigation strategy
Mitigation strategy includes pre-earthquake actions and an efficient restoration pol-
icy immediately after the seismic event. The pre-seismic identification of the “weak
points-and sectors” of a network for a specific seismic scenario and the definition of
the “main”, “important” and “secondary” elements at risk (parts and sectors of the
network) in “normal period”, provides a prioritization of the necessary interventions
according to the damage state and the importance of each sector of the network. The
evaluation of the “global value” in crisis period, the estimation of the vulnerability
assessment of the element at risk and the essential human and material resources are
indispensable for the development of an efficient recovery plan. Prioritization policies
may be defined applying simple double-entrance tables like the one given below for
water-pipes (Table 7). An example of a prioritization identification strategy is given
in Fig. 18 for the Thessaloniki water system combining the vulnerability assessment
and their urban importance.
In a more advanced level, the prioritization policy can be defined through the com-
bination of global value, vulnerability, direct cost and system’s reliability. A decision
making process of the above factors will define the priorities of the state authorities
and lifelines companies.Moreover, in order to decide upon the appropriatemitigation
strategy, the expected economic consequences of lifeline damages for a given seismic
scenario should be also evaluated. In general if the economic cost (direct and indi-
rect) is limited, the mitigation strategy will be focused then in the restoration process
otherwise pre-earthquake risk reduction countermeasures will be indispensable.
Mitigation strategies in the proposed methodology is a straight forward process,
as it depends upon the selected seismic scenarios and the lifeline system, the specific
inventory, the study period, the importance and the vulnerability of the element at risk.
Mitigation strategies can be re-run only if some of the assumptions and requirements
differentiate.
13 Conclusions
Seismic risk evaluation andmanagement of lifelines is a very sensitive issue in Europe,
especially for Mediterranean and Balkan countries where higher seismicity is concen-
trated. Within RISK-UE project, several steps forward were made to establish a
unified European typology and to validate available fragility curves of all elements at
risk taking into account the distinctive European features of lifelines. The proposed
approach for loss estimation for lifelines estimates the interactions between urban
environment and lifelines through an urban global seismic assessment approach as
lifeline networks are strongly influenced by urban fabric, economical and the social
value of their subcomponents and their individual characteristics. The classification of
Table 7 Risk analysis matrix showing seismic retrofit priorities (Alexoudi et al. 2005)
Urban Risk/Seismic Risk Issues
Main Important Secondary
Breaks 1st priority 1st priority 2nd priority
Leaks 2nd priority 3rd priority 3rd priority
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Fig. 18 Thessaloniki: Prioritization strategy for water system restoration for the 475 years recurrence
period scenario
the relative importance of lifeline elements (or sectors) through appropriate criteria,
using a decision making process for every element of lifeline systems for the three
operation periods (normal, crisis and recovery) lead to a more efficient holistic mit-
igation strategy. An important aspect treated in RISK-UE and shortly presented in
this paper is the definition of mitigation priorities based on the estimation of expected
damages for a given seismic hazard scenario and the combination of vulnerability
and classification of the relative urban importance. The whole approach is developed
in a GIS environment, able to produce various thematic maps with the risk analysis
results for different seismic scenarios. The cooperation with local authorities, lifeline
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managers and engineers, is necessary to evaluate the priorities defined and to set an
efficient European mitigation strategy for lifelines.
Concluding, the proposed approach is a relatively advanced methodology for the
seismic risk assessment of lifelines. Previous experience has been used introducing
some interesting new ideas regarding the European distinctive features of lifelines,
the seismic hazard assessment and the consideration of material and immaterial indi-
cators to estimate losses and mitigation strategies. Further work is still needed espe-
cially in the massive damage data collection for lifelines that should be combined
with detailed inventory GIS-related databases. Moreover, several steps should be
made also in the development of fragility and restoration curves and in the estimation
of losses (material and immaterial). Extension of the proposed methodology should
include estimation of impacts on a broader scale that uses also network analysis for
all lifeline elements.
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